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1. Introduction 
 
The comparative capitalism literature sees national business systems as 
‘configurations of institutions’, where different socio-economic institutions are 
interconnected in coherent, non-random ways (Jackson & Deeg 2008). From a 
comparative perspective it is argued that different countries cluster into a 
limited number of ‘models’ (Albert 1993, Whitley 2000, Hall & Soskice 2001, 
Amable 2003). Whilst different classifications exist, virtually all of them group 
the six Anglo-Saxon countries into the same category of market-based, 
shareholder-oriented or ‘liberal market economies’ (LMEs). 
 
The similarities in the institutional configuration of the Anglo-Saxon 
economies would lead us to predict similar conditions for doing business and 
comparable economic trajectories. However the 2008 financial crisis has 
demonstrated that the broad categorizations of models of capitalism may 
conceal important differences among these LMEs. Indeed, the Anglo-Saxon 
variety of capitalism groups some of the worst hit countries with countries 
whose financial systems were remarkably stable during the crisis. As evident 
in the Financial Times’ ranking of the 50 largest banks by market 
capitalization (Financial Times, March 2009), between 1999 and 2009, 
American and British banks had lost considerable ground whilst those of the 
two other main Anglo-Saxon countries, Canada and Australia, clearly gained. 
This casts doubt on the conclusion that the 2008 crisis represents a crisis of 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism as such. 
 
This paper examines the question of why the four main Anglo-Saxon countries 
experienced the 2008 financial crisis in such divergent ways, despite their 
similar cultural attributes (Redding 2005), legal origins (La Porta et al. 1997) 
and institutional configuration (Hall & Soskice 2001). Of particular interest are 
the reasons behind the rise to dominance of the British and American financial 
sectors – and the resulting shift in the balance of the economy in their favour. 
This is in sharp contrast to the Canadian and Australian systems, where greater 
restraint prevented a similar outcome.  
 
We explore how political, ideational and historical factors led to different 
approaches to the regulation of the financial industry, focusing on the 
influences shaping the process of economic liberalization in each country and 
their effect on the evolution of corporate governance. Our analysis reveals a 
clear division in the interpretation of liberal economic theory and the way it 
was applied. This gave rise to more than just the ‘fundamentalist’ neoclassical 
incarnation, characteristic of both British and American capitalism: by contrast, 
the Canadian and Australian systems evolved in a more balanced
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way, producing an apparently more stable result. From this, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that there is in fact no such a thing as ‘Anglo-Saxon 
Capitalism,’ and consequently, no general failure of liberal capitalism per se. 
Instead, the 2008 crisis suggests the failing of a particular variety of economic 
liberalism, where the balance between the state and the private sector had 
become unsustainable.  
 
We begin by examining the similarities among the four main Anglo-Saxon 
economies, and why, at first glance, they might have been expected to respond 
to a general crisis in comparable ways. We then consider the influences that 
caused the interpretation of liberal economic theory and its translation into 
policy to diverge – ultimately producing the two varieties discerned in our 
analysis. Finally we examine the role of regulation – de-regulation and re-
regulation – in the 2008 crisis before turning to our conclusions. 
 
1.1 One crisis, two outcomes  
 
The US, UK, Canada and Australia, along with Ireland and New Zealand, 
constitute the ‘Anglosphere’ and are all within the LME variety of capitalism 
(Hall & Soskice 2001).1 The four share a variety of features, stemming from 
their common historical and cultural heritage, that distinguish them from other 
advanced economies, notably continental Europe and Japan.  
 
Yet, although many have interpreted the recent financial crisis as one of 
Anglo-Saxon capitalism, there are compelling differences in the relative 
resilience of the four countries’ financial systems during the crisis. As evident 
in Table 1, compared with a decade earlier, the largest Canadian and 
Australian banks gained ground in terms of market capitalization whilst 
American and British banks lost heavily.2 The contrast is even starker when the 
magnitude of bank bailouts is considered. By March 2009, American rescue 
packages amounted to 6.8 per cent of GDP and the UK’s a staggering 19.8 per 
cent (Stewart 2009). By contrast, Australia used only 0.1 per cent of GDP to 
help struggling banks and Canada, nothing at all.3 
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Table 1: Change in bank market capitalization  
 
 Change 1999-2009 ($bn) 
Australia +85.6 
Canada +97.5 
UK -211.4 
USA -633.0 
 
Source:  Financial Times, 23 March 2009, p.9. 1999 values are as of 31 May 
1999; 2009 values are as of 17 March 2009. 
 
From a comparative capitalism point of view, these differences are surprising. 
If the global financial crisis was a crisis of neo-liberal, market-based capitalism, 
then Australia and Canada should have been equally vulnerable. Moreover, the 
macro-economic imbalances, to which the recent crisis has been widely 
attributed (FSA 2009), were present in all four countries, to varying degrees.4 
Capital account liberalization combined with imbalances in household savings 
rates between Asia and the West, contributing to the availability – and uptake – 
of cheap and plentiful debt. In the largely post-industrial Anglo-Saxon 
economies, this money found its way into the consumer sector, inflating a 
property bubble and significantly increasing the ratio of mortgage debt to 
GDP.5 Consumer leverage also rose; and mortgages were made at ever-higher 
initial loan-to-value ratios, as borrowers and lenders assumed that debt burdens 
would ultimately fall as a result of continued house price appreciation. Asset 
bubbles are significantly associated with financial crises (Reinhart & Rogoff 
2009), particularly when inflated prices are used as collateral to raise further 
debt.  
 
Economic liberalization and deregulation since the early 1970s have also been 
identified as contributing factors in the crisis (FSA, 2009; Reinhart & Rogoff, 
2009). But recent studies suggest that the four countries’ trajectories were 
comparable and that they have all become considerably more ‘liberal,’ 6 
especially since the early 1980s. They were the four most liberalized of the 
OECD countries in 1980, a position they maintained in 2000, although the UK 
had overtaken Australia as the second most liberal after the US (Höpner, 
Petring, Seikel & Werner 2009). The effect of economic liberalization was 
particularly apparent in the four countries’ financial sectors, which rapidly 
replaced manufacturing as the driver of employment and growth (Boyer 2000, 
Peters 2011). In 1970, the value added by banks, real estate and other business 
services accounted for 14.6 per cent of total value added in Australia, 17 per 
cent in Canada, 15.9 per cent in the UK and 17.5 per cent in the US. By the 
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early 2000s, it had risen to 29.1 per cent in Australia, 25.6 per cent in Canada, 
30.1 per cent in the UK and 32.1 per cent in the US, whilst services as a 
proportion employment represented 74.9 per cent in Australia, 74.7 per cent in 
Canada, 73.6 per cent in the UK and 77.5 per cent in the US (OECD, 2009).  
 
However, whilst Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) identify financial market 
liberalization as an important determinant of financial crises, the resilience of 
the Canadian and Australian banking systems suggests that this is not always 
the case, and that liberalization can be achieved without necessarily creating 
major instabilities. 
 
2. Changing the Conventional Wisdom 
 
In his book The Affluent Society, Galbraith argued that the ‘conventional 
wisdom’ in economics is inherently conservative and gives way not so much to 
new ideas as to ‘the massive onslaught of circumstances with which [it] cannot 
contend’ (Galbraith 1999, 17). This creates the environment in which different 
ideas find favour and reconstitute the conventional wisdom. Friedman (1962) 
articulated the process by which new conventional wisdom becomes embedded 
in policy. In his view,   
‘Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that 
crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are 
lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop 
alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until 
the politically impossible becomes politically inevitable.’  
Once crisis had struck, Friedman believed that it was crucial to act swiftly, 
before the moment was overtaken by the ‘tyranny of the status quo.’ 
(Friedman & Friedman 1984, 3) 7 
 
One example of this was the replacement of ‘laissez-faire’ economic liberalism 
by Keynesian conventional wisdom, triggered by the mass unemployment and 
poverty of the inter-war years, which eventually led to the state’s management 
of the economy. The growing inflationary crisis of the 1970s also constituted a 
‘massive onslaught of circumstance.’ But this time, the ‘ideas lying around’ 
were those of Friedman and the Chicago School economists and the 
conventional wisdom reverted to pre-Keynesian, liberal economic ideas, in 
which combating inflation depends on controlling the money supply whilst 
efficiency in the use of resources is most effectively secured by markets. 
Similar developments can be observed in the evolution of theory and policy 
relating to corporate governance, with the efficient market hypothesis 
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emerging to provide the orthodox explanation for – and justification of – the 
role of the stock market in reorganising industry and its ownership.8 
 
We are now potentially in the midst of another ‘Galbraithian Episode;’ giving 
rise to doubts about the conventional wisdom of economic liberalism, and 
debate about the future direction of theory and policy. However, the apparently 
sustainable economic liberalism evolved in Canada and Australia suggests that 
some incarnations of liberal theory may in fact be able to contend with that 
‘massive onslaught’ after all.  
 
In the following sections, we examine the underlying theories behind 
economic liberalism, the reasons for its ascendancy during the decades leading 
up to the 2008 financial crisis, and most crucially the varying processes of 
economic liberalization in the US, UK, Canada and Australia. We focus on the 
way that economic liberalism was understood and translated into policy; and 
we argue that this would define the relationship between the private sector and 
the state, the nature and extent of regulation, the relative position of the 
financial sector in the broader economy and ultimately, the relative resilience 
of the system as a whole.  
 
2.1 Keynesianism displaced by the promises of economic liberalism 
 
Contemporary economic liberalism, particularly in Britain and America, was 
strongly influenced by the work of Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedman and 
the Chicago School economists. John Ranelagh tells an anecdote of a Tory 
party meeting during the 1970s when Margaret Thatcher took a copy of 
Hayek’s Constitution of Liberty from her purse. She brandished it at a speaker 
who had argued for a pragmatic middle way between right and left, declaring 
‘This is what we believe!’ (quoted in Gamble 1996).  
 
Milton Friedman, too, was an influential figure in the emergence of the British 
and American ‘new right.’ As prices and unemployment rose together despite 
counter-inflationary measures, he revived pre-Keynesian monetary theory and 
argued that inflation is purely a monetary phenomenon, caused by an increase 
in the money supply in excess of real growth at the natural level of 
unemployment (NAIRU). From this perspective, there is a level of 
unemployment at which prices are stable, a natural level determined by 
inflexibilities and imperfections in the labour market. Thus, excesses in 
monetary expansion generate inflation; and unemployment stems not from an 
insufficiency of effective demand but from labour market imperfections 
resulting from state and trade union intervention, overly generous welfare 
benefits that discourage work, and the poor quality and low motivation of 
6 
 
those without work which makes them unemployable at the prevailing wage. 
As such factors were considered to be determinants of the natural rate of 
unemployment, attempts by government to increase employment beyond this 
level were theorized to either increase inflation or squeeze-out employment 
elsewhere in the economy (Friedman 1977).9 
 
During the 1970s, as inflation appeared out of control, these alternative 
theories displaced Keynesianism as the conventional wisdom in economics and 
were progressively incorporated into government policy. But deep recessions 
during the early 1980s and 1990s undermined confidence in Monetarism, 
which was ultimately replaced by ‘rational expectations’ theory.10 Meanwhile, 
the task of dealing with employment and competitiveness was delegated to 
market reforms. Markets and business were de-regulated; large sections of the 
public sector were privatised; and taxes on the rich were cut to encourage 
enterprise. Trade unions were weakened; legal control of labour standards was 
relaxed; out-of-work benefits were reduced and made subject to more onerous 
conditions; and wage subsidisation was introduced with the express purpose of 
lowering NAIRU and generating higher levels of employment. In the interest 
of freeing-up global financial markets, exchange rate controls were removed, 
encouraging banks and other financial institutions to move off-shore. As a 
consequence, attempts to regulate the banking and financial sector became 
increasingly futile; and any remaining control over the money supply was lost. 
 
Thus, in contemporary economic liberalism, the focus of theory and policy 
centred on the monetary causes of inflation and the efficiency and welfare 
benefits associated with free markets. The Central Bank was assigned 
responsibility for controlling inflation by means of interest rate policy while 
the Central Government assumed responsibility for maintaining market 
freedom. This effectively severed the theoretical and policy link between the 
dynamics of financial markets and those of other markets. 
 
2.2 Economic liberalism in theory 
 
The underlying assumption of the neo-classical model of economic liberalism 
is that self-regulating markets transform the inherent selfishness of individuals 
into general economic well-being. The market is seen as providing 
opportunities and incentives for individuals to fully exploit their property 
(labour in the case of workers), whilst preventing them from exploiting any 
advantages that ownership might afford by throwing them into competition 
with others similarly endowed. By these means, markets are assumed to 
provide a forum in which the values of individual contributions are collectively 
determined by the choices of buyers and sellers. Judgements are delivered as 
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market prices, which guide labour and other resources to their most efficient 
use. Competitive markets should therefore function as equilibrating 
mechanisms, delivering both optimal economic welfare and distributional 
justice. Neo-classical economic liberals therefore assert that man-made laws 
and institutions need to conform to the laws of the market if they are not to be 
in restraint of trade and by extension economically damaging. From this logic 
follows a radical anti-government rhetoric, best expressed in Ronald Reagan’s 
assertion that ‘Government is not the solution to our problem. Government is 
the problem’. From this perspective, the effective functioning of markets was 
best assured by ‘rolling back the state.’  
 
In addition to the claim of minimal state intervention, neo-classical economic 
liberalism also has a perspective on how the state should intervene in the 
economy when required. One of the central aims is that the state should 
regulate economic activity; but it should not intervene as an economic actor 
(Gamble 1996). It should ‘steer,’ but not ‘row.’ In other words, the state should 
not concern itself with the outcome of the economic game; it should instead 
make sure that there is room for the ‘game’ to be played. 
 
Whilst this describes the interpretation and implementation of economic 
liberalism in the US and UK, the process of economic liberalization in Canada 
and Australia does not appear to have stemmed from such a narrow doctrinal 
root. There is no policy agenda in either country that could be branded with the 
name of its champion in the same way that ‘Reaganomics’ or ‘Thatcherism’ 
have been. This is largely a result of the political and economic power of the 
provinces, states and territories relative to central government as well as the 
range of participants in the economic policy-making process. The result is a 
more even balance of power between the state and the private sector, which 
seems to have curbed the excesses of both and produced a more stable political 
and economic system. It is worth noting, however, that this more balanced 
outcome is a result of the inter-play of responses to events during the process 
of economic liberalization rather than of a deliberate approach to liberal 
economic policy. 
 
2.3 Economic liberalization in the US and the UK 
 
The return to economic liberalism was strongly influenced by the political and 
economic climate of the 1970s and early 1980s. Whilst in the US and the UK, 
it is associated with the rise to power of the politically conservative 
governments of Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, its origins can be 
traced to the early 1970s and the liberal responses of the Nixon and Heath 
governments to the economic challenges of that decade.  
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During the 1960s, especially in America, the emphasis in economic policy had 
shifted – from maintaining full employment and a high level of aggregate 
demand to a ‘new economics’ focused on economic growth (Perry & Tobin 
2000). In 1961, confronted with recession, the newly elected Kennedy-Johnson 
administration’s expansionary policy response reflected the view that rising 
unemployment was caused by cyclical as opposed to structural factors. The 
resulting strong growth seemed to justify this perspective and boosted 
confidence in the direction of economic policy at the time. Real interest rates 
remained low and investment strong, largely due to confidence about future 
profits. Yet Johnson’s chief economic strategist, Gardner Ackley, was quoted 
in a 1965 article in Time Magazine as saying ‘We’re learning to live with 
prosperity and frankly, we don’t know as much about managing prosperity as 
getting there.’ 
 
As it turned out, he was right. The prosperity of the 1960s masked growing 
imbalances (Marglin and Schor 2007). With production scraping up against the 
economy’s capacity limits, productivity growth began to slow and by 1965, the 
economy was beginning to show signs of strain. Labor costs rose faster than 
productivity; consumer and wholesale price inflation accelerated sharply and 
the federal budget was increasingly strained by the war in Viet Nam (Clark 
1979). As the newly re-built Japanese and European production systems began 
to come on-line, manufacturing imports surged and the US balance of trade 
deteriorated. In 1971, in response to its first trade deficit since before World 
War One, and under pressure to devalue the currency, President Nixon took 
Milton Friedman’s advice and announced that the US would no longer provide 
gold backing for the American dollar (Helleiner 1994, 115-21). 11  This 
effectively lifted the capital controls that had been introduced in 1944 under 
the Bretton Woods Agreement. Although Japanese and Western European 
governments lobbied for voluntary capital controls in an effort to maintain a 
degree of policy autonomy, the US refused, urging other countries to follow its 
lead (Helleiner 1994). With the collapse of Bretton Woods, international 
capital movement restrictions and fixed currency relationships were eliminated. 
 
It is important to note that during the Nixon and Ford administrations, 
advocates of neo-liberal economic thought held influential positions on the 
Council of Economic Advisors and in the Treasury (Helleiner 1994, 115). 
After Nixon’s resignation, there was a brief return to the use of Keynesian 
tools by the Democratic Carter administration, in an effort to mitigate the 
effects of the first oil shock. But the Iranian revolution in 1979 set off another 
oil shock; and with inflation and unemployment rising sharply and American 
hostages being taken by Islamist militants in Tehran, in 1980 Ronald Reagan 
was elected President, by a landslide. 
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In the UK, the over-riding problem during the 1960s had been the plight of 
Sterling, causing the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to put pressure on the 
government to address the problem through monetary policy (Marglin & Schor 
2007, 139). In 1971, the Heath government introduced a policy of 
‘Competition and Credit Control,’ in an effort to liberalize the money markets 
and stimulate competition among banks. Quantitative limits on bank lending 
were removed, liquidity requirements reduced, and interest rates were allowed 
to play a more central role in credit allocation. In response to rising 
unemployment, the Heath government also made a ‘dash for growth.’12 Fiscal 
and monetary expansion and macroeconomic growth were accelerated by 
increased bank lending. However, against a backdrop of international 
inflationary conditions during the 1970s, speculation inflated a property bubble 
resulting in the Secondary Banking Crisis of 1973-5. The Bank of England 
quickly provided emergency liquidity, averting a wider collapse. But these 
policies did not have the desired longer-term effect. 
 
The elections in 1974 eventually resulted in the Labour Party’s James 
Callaghan becoming Prime Minister. Confronted with a Sterling crisis and 
fiscal deficit, he was persuaded by the promises of Monetarism; and in a 
speech at the 1976 Labour Party Conference, he warned that ‘you could not 
spend your way out of recession. It only fuelled problems by injecting inflation 
into the economy. The result was higher inflation, followed by higher 
unemployment. That is the history of the last 20 years’ (Smith 2006). But 
Callaghan would not get the chance put this policy into practice. In 1979, 
Britain returned to a Conservative government, led by Margaret Thatcher. 
 
In Britain and America, the 1980s ushered in a strengthening commitment to 
the neo-liberal political and economic agenda. What came to be known as 
‘Reaganomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’ are associated with laissez-faire, supply side 
economics, shifting the policy focus from aggregate demand to the economy’s 
productive capacity. ‘Business friendly’ policies included tax cuts, weakening 
of trade unions and reduction of the government’s role in the economy, whilst 
monetary policy – manipulating the money supply – was used to combat 
inflation. In the UK, public industries were privatized and people were 
encouraged to buy property (Skidelsky 1990, Johnson 1991). In the US, the 
economy was de-regulated and the defence industry modernized (Boskin 1989). 
Throughout the 1980s, despite strong pressure from organized labour and their 
Democratic and Labour party allies to protect domestic industry and 
employment, both Reagan and Thatcher believed that protectionism would 
only create inefficiency and competitive weakness; unions were seen to have 
caused wage inflation and industrial disruption. Both leaders thus remained 
10 
 
committed to allowing free market ideology to determine the winners and 
losers in industry and they challenged the legitimacy of organized labour. In 
the US, Reagan’s success in shaping policy was aided by the fact that for the 
first time in twenty eight years, Republicans gained control of the Senate; and 
although the Democrats retained a narrow majority in the House, Republicans 
and Conservative Democrats accounted for an effective majority.  
 
The apparent return to economic prosperity during the 1980s boosted 
confidence in neo-liberal economic theory and policy. However, by the end of 
the decade, both the US and UK had high levels of fiscal debt; and 
responsibility for social welfare had been largely individualized. A less 
obvious effect was that in both countries a significant shift in relative power 
had also taken place, with the private sector – finance in particular – increasing 
their influence, at the expense of the state. Both Reagan and Thatcher had 
begun their administrations with enough political clout to push through a 
narrow political and economic vision; but that vision would ultimately result in 
less clout for future governments. 
 
2.4 Economic liberalization in Canada and Australia 
 
The challenges of the 1970s also encouraged a return to economic liberalism in 
Canada and Australia. However, the process assumed a more balanced form 
than it did in the US and UK, due in large part to the existence and relative 
strength of countervailing political and economic forces that mitigated against 
the imposition of a narrow policy agenda by a dominant central government. 
There was to be no Thatcher or Reagan in either country and no central 
government with the power to do as it wished. The process was also overseen 
by mostly liberal or labour – rather than conservative – governments. 
 
In Canada, confidence in Keynesianism remained strong during the 1970s, 
despite the turbulence of that era and a concerted effort by political and 
business coalitions to mobilize support for neo-liberal economic policies 
(Enoch 2007). Distrust of big business and the free market system was 
reinforced by the 1973 oil crisis, when Canadian oil companies seemed to 
profit at the expense of consumers; and in 1974, in an attempt to stabilize 
inflation, Trudeau was forced to introduce controversial wage and price 
controls. In his view, this ‘amounted to a massive intervention in the decision-
making power of economic groups, and it’s telling Canadians that we haven’t 
been able to make it work, the free market system’ (Clarke 1997, 11).  
 
Nevertheless, the difficulties of the 1970s and early 1980s put pressure on the 
fiscal budget and challenged faith in economic management. In 1984, after 
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twelve years of Trudeau’s liberal government, the progressive conservative 
government of Brian Mulroney came to power. But the constitutionally-based 
economic powers of the Canadian provinces and the relative strength of 
organized labour meant that economic liberalism had to reflect the interests of 
a broad range of constituencies. According to Norrie and Owram (1991, 620), 
taken as a package, Canada’s liberal reforms ‘constitute a consistent policy 
agenda, with the twin themes of increasing reliance on market signals to guide 
the allocation of resources and a desire to accommodate the diverse regional 
nature of the Canadian economy and society more formally in the formulation 
of economic and social policy.’ 
 
In Australia, economic liberalism was incorporated into policy by the labour 
governments of Bob Hawke (1983-1991) and Paul Keating (1991-1996), under 
the banner of ‘economic rationalism.’ Economic rationalists had a mainstream 
post-war view, blending Keynesian macroeconomic theory with neo-classical 
microeconomics, based on a simple model of perfect competition that allowed 
for market failure, market imperfection and externalities (Quiggin 1997). From 
this perspective, government intervention was justified in order to correct 
market failures and stabilize the level of employment and output (Patience and 
Head 1979). 
 
Rather than being imposed by the government and economic rationalists, 
however, the process of economic liberalization in Australia was a negotiated 
one that sought a balance between the concerns of business, markets and the 
broader community (Argy 2001). Following its election, the Hawke 
government held a politically successful national economic summit, creating a 
tripartite system that extended the accord between government and organized 
labour to include business interests (Quiggin 1998). It also continued the social 
democratic policy of earlier liberal governments. The expansionary fiscal 
policy inherited from the Fraser government was maintained and extended; 
social welfare benefits were raised and a national health insurance system was 
introduced.  
 
Thus, as in Canada, economic liberalization in Australia did not result in a 
dismantling of the welfare state; and it was not accompanied by de-regulation. 
Instead, it involved a range of relevant stakeholders and was accompanied by 
regulation designed to ensure that markets operated effectively and that the 
private sector profit motive did not impede the provision of public services or 
the public good (Argy 2001). According to Berg (2008), ‘the most striking 
attribute of the last few decades is how Australian governments have matched 
privatisations and liberalizations with regulatory expansion, rather than retreat. 
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Governments have shifted away from the direct provision of services, to the 
regulation of those services.’ 
 
3. Countervailing Power in the Anglo-Saxon World 
 
The above narratives tracing the evolution of different interpretations of liberal 
capitalism demonstrate that the frameworks of national financial systems are 
determined in complex, on-going processes, where different events and actors 
influence the outcome. An important element, which seems to explain in part 
why the British and American financial systems were particularly vulnerable, 
is the lack of willingness on the part of governments and regulators to oppose 
the industry’s desire for ever more far-reaching liberalization. Both Australia 
and Canada had much more determined governments that reined in the 
industry’s options and created a more stable structure. This state capacity can 
in turn be related to certain features of the state in the two countries. Here, the 
presence and relative strength of countervailing powers in the policy-making 
process is important. The more ‘veto players’ or ‘veto points’ there are – i.e., 
those who can block or modify a given policy – the more difficult it becomes 
for any single actor to get what they want (Tsebelis 2000). Such players in the 
countries in our study include electoral, corporate governance and industrial 
relations systems, which served to shape relations within and between actors in 
the political system, industry and organized labour. It is to these that we now 
turn. 
 
3.1 Electoral systems 
 
The US, UK, Canada and Australia are all liberal / constitutional democracies 
in which the decision-making power of elected representatives is moderated by 
a constitution that emphasizes protection of individual liberties and minority 
rights within society. The US is a constitutional republic with a presidential 
system of government in which executive, legislative and judicial powers are 
separated in order that no individual or group has absolute power. Thus, whilst 
the president’s ability to implement policy is ultimately dependent on the 
support of Congress, the system is set up to limit the power of the executive, 
whose party may or may not control the Senate and the House of 
Representatives. During the first six years of the Reagan government, the 
Conservatives’ control over the House and Senate effectively lifted the 
electoral constraint on the President’s ability to implement radical changes in 
policy, with very significant knock-on effects. These early changes would 
effect a shift in power away from central government and towards the private 
sector, paving the way for an increasingly powerful lobbying base which 
would, in time, help put in place the preconditions for a major financial crisis 
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The UK, Canada and Australia are constitutional monarchies with a 
parliamentary system of government in which the British monarch is head of 
state and an elected prime minister is head of government. The executive and 
legislative branches of government are not separate, but the prime minister is 
dependent on the support of Parliament.13 As a result, a Prime Minister is on 
the face of it, less likely than an American President to face strong opposition 
to the policy agenda of central government. This was the case under Thatcher; 
and the apparent success of the neo-liberal policy agenda meant that New 
Labour did little to reverse the current of policy when it came to power in the 
late 1990s. In Canada and Australia, however, the political and economic 
strength of the provinces, states and territories and the more collective 
approach to the formulation of policy served as a moderating force within the 
system, highlighting the importance of the nature and structure of the 
relationship between central and regional government.  
 
Whilst the UK is a unitary state, with a centralized national government, it has 
devolved some powers to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales; but the Prime 
Minister still has considerable influence over the direction of policy. By 
contrast, the US, Canada and Australia are federal states, with partially self-
governing regions and states, united by a central government. In the US, the 
diffuse nature of political power and reliance on the support of Congress, with 
representation from each of the fifty states, serves to limit the President’s 
influence over the direction of policy; and this acts as an impediment to major 
shifts in the direction of policy from one administration to the next. However, 
with fifty states, as opposed to the much smaller number of provinces and 
territories in Canada and Australia, strong opposition to central government 
policy is harder to crystallize. Yet as we saw during the 1980s, the nature and 
structure of the electoral system had a clear influence on the ability of the 
executive to push forward an economic and policy agenda. In both Britain and 
America, a single vision was implemented, by and large, as intended. Ronald 
Reagan had, perhaps unusually, the benefit of Republican and conservative 
Democratic control of Congress to help pass a raft of liberalising legislation 
during his first term in office. This helped to shift the balance of power, as the 
state gave ground to the private sector, which only made it easier to pass 
further legislation in the future. In the same way, opposition to the Thatcher 
programme was also weak and relatively ineffective. The British system tends 
to allow a prime minister with a large majority in the House of Commons and 
a relatively united party to implement their policy agenda with very little 
moderating influence.   
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In Canada and Australia, on the other hand, the political and economic strength 
of the provinces, states and territories not only limits the extent to which 
central government can unilaterally impose a policy agenda; it also means that 
policy is determined through a process of negotiation and compromise 
involving a range of stakeholder groups from various competing geographical 
constituencies and both sides of industry. This also contributes to a cultural 
divide with regard to perceptions about the balance between the state and the 
private sector. In Britain and America, where the state has withdrawn in favour 
of the private sector over the last thirty years, there is frequently a presumption 
of the primacy of the private sector. In both Canada and Australia, government 
has played a much stronger part and if anything, the presumption is in favour 
of the state. This difference was a significant contributor to moderating the 
process of liberalization. 
 
3.2 Corporate governance and ‘the market for corporate control’ 
 
The effect of the presence or otherwise of countervailing power was especially 
clear in the evolution of corporate governance and the financial sector. From 
the 1960s onwards, finance assumed a progressively larger role in both the 
British and American economies.  
 
In Britain, corporate raiders, such as Tiny Rowland, James Goldsmith and Jim 
Slater of Slater Walker showed what could be done with leveraged finance 
(BBC 1999). They then passed the baton to the Americans, like Michael 
Milkin and Ivan Bosky, and to the mutual fund managers, who by and large 
continued the process in the US and UK. The motivation for the bankers, 
shareholders and investors was the realisation of large, short-term profits and 
the creation of funds with which to carry on the process, targeting ever larger 
businesses and selling off acquired assets to finance the debt (Bluestone and 
Harrison 1982, Reich 2008). The benefits for the businesses involved, however, 
were transitory at best, often amounting to little more than a brief spike in the 
share price. Many were left without the resources to sustain their productive 
activities; and the large numbers of job losses involved – both from 
announcements of layoffs (that served to excite the markets) and from the 
industrial restructuring that typically followed hostile acquisitions – did little to 
improve the relationship between unions and the governments of the day 
(Deakin and Singh 2008, Bluestone and Harrison 1982, Reich 2008). This was 
particularly the case in the US and UK, where many of the corporate raiders 
were political insiders. Nevertheless, the short-term increase in share price 
convinced some that the combination of leveraged finance and asset stripping 
was delivering results while others saw it as economic cannibalism. 
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Whilst the tactics of corporate raiding were exported wholesale from Britain to 
America, with similar effect, takeovers in Australia had only a brief heyday 
during the 1980s and in Canada they were never really a factor. The reasons 
for this are both cultural and structural, and are a significant part of the story of 
finance in the Anglo-Saxon economies.  
 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance is typically characterized by widely 
dispersed equity ownership among individuals and institutions, prioritization 
of shareholder interests in company law and the protection of minority 
shareholder interests by securities law and regulation. Hall and Soskice (2001) 
argue that rather than being based on bank-finance, financial systems in LMEs 
are centred on the financial markets. This is a result of the relaxation or even 
lack of capital flow regulation that also tends to be a feature of these 
economies. In LMEs, stock markets are well developed and play a central role. 
A similar argument, based on different assumptions, can be found in the Law 
and Finance literature. La Porta et al. (1997), for example, posit that common 
law countries in the Anglo-Saxon world have more developed financial 
markets than do civil law countries. Nevertheless, the role played by the stock 
market in the US and UK differs sharply from that in Canada and Australia, 
particularly with respect to the re-structuring of industry and the economy 
during economic liberalization. 
 
In the US and UK, the leveraged buyouts 1980s effectively dismantled the 
heavy industrial sectors in both countries. Unions were weakened and 
opportunities for longer term investment in manufacturing curtailed. During 
the 1990s, this process was carried on in America by institutional investors, 
reacting to the enormous loss of (long-term) shareholder value that had 
resulted from the poor performance, or in many cases failure, of the productive 
organizations previously targeted by the corporate raiders. Investor activism 
took a variety of forms in the US and UK, but it demonstrated the increasing 
power of the shareholder – and the will to use it. 
 
Liberal economic theorists lauded the stock exchange as an ‘efficient market’ 
for managerial control in which the value of a company’s shares reflected the 
value of the underlying productive enterprise (Fama 1970).14 The stock market 
boom was taken as evidence of overall industrial strength while the short-term 
increase in share prices resulting from cost cutting in companies that had been 
taken-over, served to reinforce these assumptions. However, the reality was 
that the ‘profits’ generated by hostile takeovers were derived from asset 
stripping (Lazonick & O’Sullivan 2000, Bluestone & Harrison 1982), and 
consequently a one off ‘blip,’ as opposed to enhanced sustainable output and 
productivity in the organizations involved.  
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The structure in much of corporate Canada and Australia however, for the 
most part mitigated against a similarly extended frenzy of leveraged buyouts. 
Both Canada and Australia have well developed stock markets and many listed 
companies with dispersed shareholder ownership. But this form of ownership 
is not the norm.  In Canada, only a minority (just under 16 percent) of the 550 
largest companies had a widely dispersed shareholder base in 1989 (Morck, 
Strangeland & Yeung 1998); and in more than 75 percent of Canadian 
companies, a single shareholder – often a wealthy family – controlled at least 
20 percent of the voting shares (Rao & Lee-Sing 1995). In Australia, too, share 
ownership tends to be concentrated; and there is a much higher incidence of 
founding family and inter-company control than in the US and UK.  According 
to Clarke (2007, 145), ‘all the evidence suggests that Australian business has 
maintained an unusually high degree of block-holder control.’ In 1999, only 11 
of the 20 largest public quoted companies did not have a shareholder that held 
10 percent or more of the equity, with a similar pattern among smaller 
companies (Clarke 2007, Stapledon 1998). 
 
It is unsurprising then, that in both Canada and Australia, the takeover market 
is not particularly active. Dignam and Galanis (2004, 20) conclude that the 
discipline mechanism of the American and British market for corporate control 
‘is absent from the Australian listed market’ and that ‘block-holders exercise 
control over key decisions as to the sale of the company.’  Similarly, a 2008 
study of Canadian companies found that ‘a significant share of Canadian firms 
is largely immune to hostile takeover attempts’ (Secor 2008, 6).  
 
3.3. Labour relations 
 
In most industrialized countries, organized labour and trade union movements 
were broadly accepted by the 1970s, and their relative power seemed secure, 
especially in countries with social democratic governments (Fairbrother & 
Griffin 2002b). During the 1980s and 1990s, however, there was a sharp 
reversal. The widespread acceptance of neo-liberalism undermined the 
pluralist political ideology upon which the justification of union involvement 
in economic, social and political activity was based; and the legitimacy of 
unions and existing labour market structures was seriously challenged.  
 
Corporate governance played a part by allowing investor interests to trump 
those of industry and labour, particularly in the US and UK. Electoral systems 
in the four countries also played a role through their influence on relations 
between the state and organised labour, and, indeed, attitudes towards labour 
generally. Canada and Australia have a much stronger tradition of Liberal or 
17 
 
Labour governments, and with the exception of the period in power of the 
Progressive Conservatives in Canada, the process of liberalization was carried 
out by these centre-left parties. The result was thus a far less confrontational 
process, involving labour; and there were relatively few scenes of industrial 
strife in the media. The situation in America, and especially Britain, could 
hardly have been more different.  
 
Already severely weakened by the industrial restructuring and 
deindustrialization triggered by the corporate raiders, trade unions in the US 
and UK resisted further concessions. Bitter and violent disputes between 
organized labour, big business and the state were widely publicized; and 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a series of laws and legal rulings further 
eroded union power, marginalizing them in political and economic policy 
(Fairbrother 2002a, Jarley 2002). As evident in Table 2, whereas trade union 
density in the UK peaked in 1980, at 52.8 percent, by 1995, it had declined to 
32.2 percent. In the US, organized labour was much weaker, with trade union 
density falling steadily from 1960, to 14.2 percent in 1995. 
 
Table 2:  Trade Union Density (percent of employed wage and salary 
earners) 
 
 1960 1970 1980 1990 1995 
Canada 28.3 29.8 36.0 36.0 37.0 
Australia 49.1 44.4 48.0 41.0 35.2 
UK 44.3 48.6 52.8 40.1 32.2 
US 28.9 25.9 22.0 16.0 14.2 
 
Source: Visser (1993); ILO (1997) and OECD (1997) 
 
In Australia, too, the ability of organized labour to effectively participate in 
political and economic policy debates was seriously eroded during the 1980s 
and 1990s (See Table 2), although not as a result of a concerted effort on the 
part of government. Despite the election of a labour government in the early 
1980s and a return to centralized wage determination in which unions assumed 
a major role, from 1987 onwards, this accord was gradually eroded; and in the 
early 1990s, a system of enterprise bargaining was introduced and extended 
(Griffin & Fairbrother 2002, 246). According to Griffin and Svensen (2002), 
the centralized nature of Australian trade union governance was unable to 
effectively cope with the decentralization of collective bargaining, 
undermining the relative strength of the union movement. 
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In sharp contrast, the Canadian trade union movement retained much of its 
membership and density during the 1980s and 1990s. Table 2 shows density 
increasing steadily throughout the period of economic liberalism. This is in 
large part due to the central role that provincial-level political action and law 
play in union-state relations and the traditional strength of the relationship 
between the local and national levels within Canadian unions (Murray 2002). 
Thus, even in an environment of employer opposition and periodic hostility on 
the part of state governments and policy, Canadian trade union strength was 
not eroded during the 1980s and 1990s, providing a voice for labor in 
economic, social and political policy debates that continues to the present. 
 
In short, whilst Canadian labour maintained its voice in the political and 
economic policy arena, the process of economic liberalization in the other 
three countries seriously undermined organized labour’s relative position, 
skewing the balance between the two sides of industry and removing or 
weakening an important countervailing force within the system. 
 
4. Financial Market Liberalization and Regulation in the Anglo-Saxon 
World 
 
Although the more obvious beginnings of financial market liberalization can 
be located in the 1970s, when international capital flow restrictions were 
removed, its roots can be traced much earlier, to the 1950s and the emergence 
of Euromarkets, regulation-free markets where banks deal in currencies other 
than their own.  
 
Following World War Two, the enormous increase in the quantity of US 
dollars held by foreign banks, companies and countries, including the Soviet 
Union, gave rise to the need for a market in which to exchange them; and 
during the cold war, this made London (rather than New York) an attractive 
centre for Eurodollar activities, which expanded rapidly during the 1960s, with 
the strong support of both the US and UK (Helleiner 1994, 81-100). This huge 
increase in available funds not only increased the importance of the city of 
London as a centre for international finance; it also gave rise to the first cross 
border hostile takeover (by Siegmund Warburg) and marked the beginning of 
the return to dominance of the American and British financial sectors 
(Fergusson 2010) 
 
4.1 The UK and US: lightly regulated financial markets and institutions 
 
Following the 1929 stock market crash, both sentiment and policy in the US 
and UK had taken a more cautious turn and the Treasury assumed greater 
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influence over monetary affairs. Since the financial community was held 
responsible for the chaos, reform focused on stricter control of domestic 
financial markets and monetary policy and on limiting the power of the central 
bank and financiers (Helleiner 1994, 32).  
 
4.1.1 American Financial Markets: regulatory fragmentation 
 
The American financial system has historically been a fragmented one. The 
Constitution gives the federal government control over the money supply but is 
silent about control of banks, so bank regulation was left to the states (Gordon 
2004). After the Civil War, the 1863 National Bank Act offered federal 
charters to banks with sufficient capital that were willing to submit to strict 
regulation by the newly created Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. But 
they were prohibited from branching across state lines or from branching 
within states that did not allow it. Despite the establishment of national banks, 
state banks proliferated. In states that did not permit branching, they were 
small and vulnerable to the economic performance of the local community in 
which they were located. In 1913, the Federal Reserve System (Fed) was 
established to regulate state banks, secondary national banks and bank holding 
companies. But instead of one, twelve Reserve banks were created, located in 
major financial centres across the country.  
 
During the Great Depression, one third of all American banks failed 
(Richardson 2007). In response, Congress made sweeping reforms: The 
Federal Reserve System was re-organized and the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) was set up. The Glass-Steagall Act separated commercial 
and retail banking from investment banking. By preventing institutions that 
were ‘principally engaged’ in banking from underwriting or dealing in 
securities and vice versa, Glass Steagall resolved the conflict of interest 
between those wanting a safe place for their money and those prepared to 
speculate. This was reinforced by the 1956 Bank Holding Act that applied the 
same separation to bank holding companies. Glass Steagall’s Regulation Q 
prohibited the payment of interest on demand deposits and put a ceiling on 
interest rates on deposit accounts in order to encourage local banks to lend 
instead of holding balances with larger banks that used these funds for 
speculative purposes. (Gilbert 1986). 
 
But there remained thousands of banks, along with thrifts, bank holding 
companies and credit unions, regulated by different authorities at both the state 
and federal levels. According to Pan (2011, 837) ‘the United States has the 
dubious distinction of having the world’s least coordinated regulatory 
structures in the world.’ 15  Nevertheless, the system was stable during the 
20 
 
prosperous postwar period, when the memory of the financial crisis and Great 
Depression was fresh. But it began to break down during the 1960s and 1970s 
as inflation accelerated and the economy confronted increasing structural 
challenges. As regulation was progressively loosened, it began to show serious 
failings – with drastic consequences. 
 
4.1.2 The American savings & loans crisis: A warning goes unheeded 
 
A clear example of the potential consequences of insufficient prudential 
oversight was the American Savings & Loans (S&L) crisis. During the 1970s, 
when inflation caused interest rates to rise above those set by Regulation Q, 
investors sought alternatives to traditional deposit accounts and funds flowed 
out of depository institutions in search of higher yields. This caused particular 
distress for the tightly regulated S&L industry, which specialized in taking 
short-term deposits and making long-term mortgage loans. Because of the risk 
of large numbers of S&L failures, the industry was quickly de-regulated. The 
Depository Institutions De-regulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 
eliminated many of the distinctions between S&Ls and banks and removed the 
interest rate cap on deposit accounts. But further inflation and competitive 
pressures pushed up the interest rates that S&Ls had to pay, causing large 
losses and some failures. No large-scale action was taken, however, as the 
Federal S&L Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) had insufficient funds to bail out 
insolvent S&Ls and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) provided 
lax supervision (Sherman 2009). 
 
The Garn–St.Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 allowed federal 
S&Ls to own projects funded by their loans. This resulted in a mass conversion 
of S&Ls from state to federal status and fuelled a commercial real estate boom. 
However, poor lending decisions and excessive leverage laid the foundations 
for the S&L crisis. This leverage was partly facilitated by Drexel Burnham 
Lambert, an investment bank which wrote the first Collateralized Debt 
Obligation (CDO) for the Imperial Savings Association in 1987. In this, loans 
were bundled together and sold on the securities market, permitting Imperial to 
remove assets from its balance sheet and generate cash for additional loans, 
with leverage increasing as the process continued. The fatal weakness was 
dependency on continually rising, or at least, stable, property prices and cheap 
debt. A downturn, or an increase in interest rates, would burst the bubble.  
 
During the early 1980s, rising interest rates cut off the cheap funding upon 
which many S&Ls relied; and with the disappearance of real estate tax shelters, 
funds dried up, causing the failure of 747 S&Ls in ‘the greatest collapse of US 
financial institutions since the Great Depression’ (Curry & Shibut 2000, 33). 
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As the total cost exceeded the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance 
Corporation’s (FSLIC) ability to pay insured depositors, US taxpayers and the 
industry were required to contribute to the insurance coverage at a total cost of 
approximately $210 billion. (Curry & Shibut 2000). In 1989, the newly elected 
Bush administration signed into law a bailout plan for the S&L industry. The 
Financial Institutions Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) abolished the 
FSLIC and transferred assets to the FDIC. The FHLBB was abolished and the 
Office of Thrift Supervision was created to regulate the S&Ls; and the 
Resolution Trust Corporation was created to dissolve and merge troubled 
institutions. 
 
Whilst many contributors to the S&L crisis bear comparison to that of 2008, a 
crucial difference was its limitation to one sector of the American banking 
industry, whose survival was not considered critical to confidence in the 
national or global financial system. As a result, the S&L crisis did not shock 
America into reforming its system of financial regulation. Ultimately, the 
response was further de-regulation, in spite of the voices calling for reform. In 
a 1996 address, delivered in Tokyo, Japan, L. William Seidman, former 
Chairman of the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC),16 said that 
during the 1980s and 1990s, the US had experienced  
 
‘a banking, S&L and credit union problem of major proportions – 
clearly the worst difficulties since the Great Depression.’  He went on to 
say that ‘given the extent of the problems, we in the US are ‘long’ on 
experience and if we don’t learn a lot from these experiences, we will 
surely repeat our problems.’ (Seidman 1997 Volume II, 55-56)   
 
In the wake of the recent financial market crisis, it would appear that the 
important lessons were not learned. 
 
4.1.3 British financial markets: a tradition of regulatory informality 
 
After the Second World War, HM Treasury assumed responsibility for 
monetary policy and regulating building societies, friendly societies and trustee 
savings banks; and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) had 
responsibility for securities and insurance regulation; and the Bank of England 
was nationalized and given responsibility for regulating banks.  
 
The Bank of England’s approach to financial supervision has historically been 
informal (Goodhart 2004), with regulation largely entrusted to the industry 
itself, through the Financial Intermediaries, Managers and Brokers Regulatory 
Association (FIMBRA). Until the 1970s, the system seemed to work well. 
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During the early 1970s, however, a number of fringe banks found themselves 
in trouble, triggering the ‘Secondary Banking Crisis.’ Precipitated by a 
property bubble, cheap debt and excessive leverage, the crisis was met with a 
financial ‘lifeboat,’ swiftly launched by the Bank to provide emergency 
liquidity. Following the crisis, the Treasury put banking regulation on a 
statutory footing. The 1979 Banking Act gave the Bank legal powers to 
underpin its supervisory authority; it also created a 2-tier system of 
‘recognized banks’ and ‘licensed institutions’ and introduced a scheme to 
protect small depositors in the event of bank failure. But the Treasury retained 
on-going responsibility for the legal framework of banking supervision and the 
performance of its regulator. 
 
The 1984 collapse of Johnson Matthey Bankers (JMB) revealed flaws in the 
1979 Act and fault lines in the regulatory system itself. To prevent a loss of 
confidence in the City of London’s gold bullion market, where JMB was a key 
player, the Bank acted once again. The Banking Act of 1987 significantly 
increased the Bank’s supervisory capacity. But this time, the Conservative 
Chancellor, Nigel Lawson felt that the Bank had acted without keeping him 
informed. A public rift ensued; straining relations between the government and 
the Bank, with obvious implications for the effectiveness of the tripartite 
system. This political tension appears to have contributed to pressures that 
were already mounting for a change in the structure of regulation, in particular, 
regulation of securities, financial markets and insurance. In 1981, a review of 
the role and functioning of financial institutions and investor protection for 
securities and other property produced the 1986 Financial Services Act, the 
first UK legislation to comprehensively regulate the securities industry and 
markets. The Securities and Investments Board (SIB) was set up to oversee the 
various self-regulatory organisations (SROs); and City firms conducting 
business in the UK were required to seek membership in an SRO or direct 
supervision by the SIB. Since the SIB’s members were appointed by the 
Treasury, the changes served to further erode the regulatory authority of the 
Bank. 
 
Throughout the 1980s, the supervision of securities and insurance remained the 
responsibility of the DTI. But as the lines between financial institutions 
became blurred, the Treasury assumed responsibility for regulating financial 
services in 1993 and insurance in 1998. In 1998, the Bank of England was 
granted operational independence and assigned responsibility for the 
implementation of monetary policy. The 2000 Financial Services and Markets 
Act created the Financial Services Authority (FSA), as a single, unified 
regulator for financial services. The Treasury has no operational or financial 
control over the FSA, which was established as a private company, limited by 
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guarantee, to emphasise its independence. There was no formal legislation 
setting out the respective responsibilities of the three financial authorities; but 
a memorandum of understanding was established, fitting the tradition at the 
Bank of England, of flexibility in the banking system and avoiding the red tape 
and restrictions found in other systems. The Memorandum delineated the 
responsibility of the Treasury as being responsible for the legal framework; the 
Bank for the stability of the financial system as a whole and the FSA for the 
supervision of individual firms.  
 
4.2 Stock market liberalization in the US and UK and ‘light touch’ 
regulation 
 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, both London and New York were 
considered the epicentres of the global financial crisis. As US Treasury 
Department Secretary, Henry Morgenthau, told the conference at Bretton 
Woods, the objective was ‘to drive the usurious money-lenders from the 
temple of international finance … [and] move the financial centre of the world 
from London and Wall Street to the US [and HM] Treasury’ (quoted in 
Gardner 1980, 76). 
 
However, as memories of the stock market crash and Great Depression faded, 
so did the atmosphere of caution; and increasing concern about restoring the 
attractiveness of London and New York to global capital gradually 
overwhelmed concerns about domestic financial market regulation. During the 
1970s and 1980s, ‘competitive deregulation’ accelerated the process of 
liberalization (Helleiner 1994, 12). In 1974, the US removed the capital 
controls it had introduced during the 1960s. Britain followed by abolishing its 
forty year old capital controls in 1979; and others were forced to follow suit or 
lose business and capital to New York and London. 
 
On 1 May, 1975, ‘Mayday,’ the New York Stock Exchange deregulated its 
commission structure, allowing competition, opening stock trading to market 
forces of supply and demand and driving down commissions. The result was 
reduced profitability of trades, and the incentive to make up the loss by 
increasing volume and economizing on market research, shifting the focus 
from ‘research and analysis’ to ‘sales.’ Britain followed in 1986, with ‘Big 
Bang.’ However, these developments also gave rise to a governance question 
of a similar nature to that addressed by the Glass Steagall Act in 1933: Are 
Chinese Walls between differing sets of interests in the same organisation a 
sufficient guarantee of probity? 
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4.2.1 USA: progressive loosening of regulation 
 
In the US, bankers had been lobbying Congress as early as the 1960s to loosen 
the restrictions of Glass- Steagall. With money market mutual funds and other 
complex financial instruments that blurred the lines between deposits and 
securities, the banking industry complained that the Glass-Steagall restrictions 
were becoming obsolete. Regulators were sympathetic on some accounts. 
There was always a fear that financial de-regulation in other countries would 
entice firms to take their capital abroad; and many in government shared the 
free market ideology of de-regulation.  
 
In 1986-7, the Fed loosened the Glass-Steagall restrictions and allowed banks 
to derive up to 5 percent of gross revenues from investment banking business 
and to handle among other things, commercial paper, municipal bonds and 
mortgage-backed securities. In 1987, Greenspan was appointed Chairman of 
the Federal Reserve Board; and early in his tenure, Glass Steagall was re-
interpreted to allow banks to deal in certain debt and equity securities, up to 10 
percent of gross revenues. In 1996, this was raised to 25 percent, which 
effectively rendered Glass-Steagall obsolete. In 1994, the Reagle-Neal 
Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act eliminated restrictions on 
interstate banking and branching and in 1999 Gram-Leach-Bliley Act repealed 
all restrictions on the combination of banking, securities and insurance 
operations for financial institutions. 
 
After the ‘big bang’ de-regulation in the City of London, US financial 
institutions had seen the potential to circumvent Glass-Steagall by means of 
overseas subsidiaries beyond its jurisdiction. This encouraged the growth of 
multi-national financial conglomerates, with a keen focus on profits and share 
price by both investors and management. It also made risk management more 
difficult, an effect magnified by the individualisation of computer technology. 
Thus, the final repeal of Glass-Steagall in 1999 under President Clinton’s 
administration seemed a relatively insignificant event. In reality though, it 
helped to inflate the sub-prime bubble by speeding up the process of 
securitising increasingly risky mortgages, as well as allowing mergers such as 
that of Citi Bank and Traveler’s Group, continuing the growth of the financial 
behemoths.  
 
4.2.2 The emergence of financial behemoths in London 
 
By the mid 1980s, London had fallen behind New York as a financial centre. 
Attributing this to excessive regulation and the ‘old boys’ network,’ the 
Thatcher government set out to remove both. In 1986, ‘Big Bang’ 
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liberalization ushered in radical cultural changes and a period of rapid 
internationalisation, with profound effects on the UK financial sector, and by 
extension, the wider economy. Prior to 1986, the City had been composed of 
small, specialist companies, largely immune from takeover. The roles of 
buying and selling were separated by intermediaries, or ‘stock jobbers,’ 
through whose books every transaction went, on a fixed-fee basis. 
 
On 27 October 1986, this regime was swept away; the buy and sell sides of 
brokerage were united and the modern trader was born. At the same time, City 
firms found themselves vulnerable to international competition and hostile 
take-over. Computerised trading and a time zone ideally placed between New 
York and Tokyo, put London at the centre of the global financial network. This 
and the easing of regulation attracted overseas banks, resulting in a wave of 
acquisitions, many by non-British institutions. This was not restricted to 
specialist City firms. By 1992 the Hong Kong Shanghai Bank (HSBC) had 
acquired the Midland Bank– then the UK’s biggest high street bank by market 
capitalisation – and moved its headquarters to London to take advantage of 
‘light touch’ regulation.  
 
British banks also pursued growth through acquisition. In 1986, Lloyds 
acquired the Continental Bank of Canada, adding the Trustee Savings Bank 
and the Cheltenham and Gloucester Bank in 1995. RBS acquired the Citizens 
Financial Group, which itself had made acquisitions, becoming the eighth 
largest bank in America and giving RBS significant representation in the US 
market. RBS also aquired NatWest in the 1990’s, and not long before the crisis, 
the Dutch bank, ABN Amro. By this process, the ‘Big Four’ UK domiciled 
banks were created.  
 
Whilst superficially this might appear similar to the Australian ‘Four Pillar’ 
policy or Canada’s system dominated by six large banks, the reality could not 
be more different. Not only were the large London-based banks highly 
internationalised in their business and consequently much less ‘British’ than 
Australian banks were ‘Australian’ or Canadian banks ‘Canadian;’ they were 
also much more diversified in terms of share ownership and vastly more 
complex in terms of management systems.  
 
Indeed, in 1981, when Standard Chartered attempted to acquire the Royal 
Bank of Scotland (RBS), against RBS’s expressed wishes, HSBC put in a 
counter-bid. Both were referred to the Monopolies and Mergers Commission 
and blocked. The failure of the HSBC bid was based on a persuasive argument 
by RBS that a large overseas-owned UK bank might be less willing to be ‘leant 
on’ in the national interest than a ‘Native’ bank, or feel a conflict between 
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public demands (i.e., to help out in  a troubled situation) and its owner’s 
interests. ‘We find,’ the Commission reported ‘that the transfer of ultimate 
control of a significant part of the clearing system outside the United Kingdom 
would have the adverse effect of opening-up possibilities of divergence of 
interest which would not otherwise arise.’ (Reid 1988) 
 
4.2.3 Summing things up 
 
In both Britain and America, the return to dominance of the London and New 
York financial centres was aided by ‘light touch’ regulation. However, The 
British and American systems are at opposite ends of the spectrum. The UK 
takes an ‘integrated’ approach, where a single universal regulator ensures 
consumer and investor protection, as well as the health and stability of 
financial institutions in all sectors of the financial services industry. By 
contrast, the US system is diffuse, with a plethora of institutions regulated by 
an equally complex system of federal and state regulatory agencies. Both 
systems have been criticized for their inability to provide supervisory oversight 
of financial institutions offering an ever expanding range of services. But 
whilst ‘modernization’ of the financial services industry has been welcomed, 
regulatory reform has met with opposition from powerful industry insiders, 
lobbyists and political activists (Gordon 2004). 
 
In short, in New York and London, regulators are charged with responsibility 
for regulating a dynamic and innovative market place, populated by highly 
internationalized financial institutions and dependent on global capital for the 
financial sector’s economic performance. An international footprint brings the 
ability to span jurisdictions, arbitrage regulatory systems and quickly relocate 
if necessary. There is thus a potential conflict of interest for the financial 
market regulators: while light touch regulation is attractive to global capital, it 
also increases the risk of instability.  
 
4.3. Canada and Australia: Financial market liberalization – but with 
regulatory reform 
 
In both Canada and Australia, prior to adoption of the current ‘twin peaks’ 
model of regulation, the approach to financial market regulation was 
institutional, with the firm’s legal status determining the regulator responsible 
for overseeing its activities. As the boundaries between financial institutions 
became increasingly blurred by the diversification of services provided, in 
stages, financial market regulation evolved into a ‘twin peaks’ system in which 
the Central Bank is responsible for monetary policy and market stability, and a 
separate regulator is responsible for safety and stability and for conduct of 
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business. Both Canada and Australia also take a ‘principles-based’ approach to 
regulation in which financial institutions are required to ensure that they meet 
both the intent and the prescription of legislation; this approach (in contrast to 
a ‘rules-based’ approach) is believed to encourage competition and innovation 
as well as to make the financial market more attractive to international 
financial institutions (Pan 2011). 
 
In both Canada and Australia, financial markets are seen as integral to the 
performance of the economy as a whole, rather than being an end in 
themselves (Nieuwenhuysen, Lloyd & Mead 2001, Courchene & Purvis 1992). 
The core of the financial services industry is a branch banking system in which 
a few large banks provide retail, commercial and investment banking services 
nationwide. Branching and diversification of financial services are seen as 
contributing to reduced vulnerability to regional and market shocks, significant 
economies of scale for the banks involved, and hence, market stability. At the 
same time, competition among the banks is considered to be in the public 
interest (Department of Industry 1997).  
 
In Canada, the government’s commitment to maintaining a balance between 
the public interest and the commercial interests of Canadian business is 
enforced by the Competition Bureau Canada (CBC), whose mandate is to 
‘ensure that Canada has a competitive marketplace and that all Canadians 
enjoy the benefits of low prices, product choice and quality service’ 
(Competition Bureau Canada 1998). Consequently, all proposed mergers are 
subject to review. In 1998, with the objective of improving their 
competitiveness in the global financial market, the Royal Bank and the Bank 
of Montreal proposed merging as did the Canadian Imperial Bank of 
Commerce (CIBC) and the Toronto Dominion Bank. However, the mergers 
were blocked on the grounds that they would work against the best interests of 
Canadians by concentrating economic power, reducing competition and 
restricting the government’s ability to address future prudential concerns (Lott 
2005).  
 
A similar balance was achieved in Australia by the government’s ‘six pillar’ 
policy, initiated by Paul Keating in 1990 when he blocked the merger 
between the ANZ Bank and the National Mutual insurance company and 
extended the ban to any merger between the four largest banks 
(Commonwealth Bank (CBA), Westpac, NAB, ANZ) and the two largest 
insurance companies (AMP and NatMut). The six-pillar policy was 
maintained until the 1996 Wallis investigation into financial system reform, 
which exposed the largest banks and insurance companies to the same level 
of take-over pressure as other publicly listed companies. Thus, in 1997, the 
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merger ban was lifted for the two insurance companies, but not the four 
largest banks, resulting in the present ‘four pillar’ policy. 
 
4.3.1 Canada’s banking ‘pillars’ – a change of architecture  
 
Traditionally, the ‘four pillars’ of Canadian banking – chartered banks, trust 
and loan companies, insurance companies and securities dealers – were distinct 
in terms of ownership, market function and legislative control, with regulations 
that enforced an institutional separation of activities and prohibited cross-
ownership. During the 1950s, however, financial innovation by ‘near banks,’ 
beyond the jurisdiction of regulation, caused a gradual blurring of the 
institutional lines differentiating financial institutions. This, in a context of 
growing concern about capital market liberalization with the decline of the 
Bretton Woods Arrangement, uncertainty about the Eurodollar market and 
competition from newly re-built Europe and Japan, led to the establishment of 
the Royal Commission on Banking and Finance in 1961. The resulting 1964 
Porter Commission Report produced the Bank Act of 1967, which loosened 
controls on interest rate ceilings and reserve requirements, to allow financial 
institutions in Canada greater flexibility in responding to market opportunities. 
It also introduced rules maintaining a clear separation between banks and their 
customers and established the Canada Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) 
to guarantee deposits of up to $60,000 Canadian (now $100,000 Canadian). 
 
During the 1970s, in response to the financial uncertainty created by soaring 
inflation, the 1980 Bank Act relaxed restrictions on ownership and entry. In 
response to this and the Mulroney government’s 1987 Deregulation bill, by the 
end of the 1980s, all of the major Canadian banks entered into the brokerage 
and investment banking business by acquiring existing firms or building their 
own (Krysanowski and Ursel 1993). This emergence of universal banking was 
met with the 1987 establishment of the Office of the Superintendent of 
Financial Institutions (OSFI) – the first of the ‘twin peaks’ – as a centralized 
regulator of banks, insurance companies and pension funds.  
 
In 1988, concerns about the globalization of finance, markets and production, 
cross-border competition in corporate and government finance and global 
financial consolidation led to the formation of the MacKay Task Force. One of 
its key findings was an information and power imbalance between financial 
institutions and their consumers and investors. In response, the Financial 
Consumer Agency of Canada (FCAC) – the second of the ‘twin peaks’ – was 
founded in 2001 to consolidate and strengthen consumer protection regulation.  
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Another concern of the Task Force was the tension between federal and 
provincial government in the regulation of the financial services industry. The 
Canadian constitution assigns national government the authority to regulate 
‘the business of banking’ but it does not define what that means (Brean et. al. 
2011). This ambiguity has impeded the establishment of a pan-Canadian 
regulatory framework, particularly with respect to securities regulation. At 
present, securities regulation is entirely in the hands of the provinces, with 
cross border regulation coordinated by the Canadian Securities Administration 
(CAS), whose membership includes the chairs of the 13 provincial 
commissions. Despite efforts to centralize securities regulation, it continues to 
be met with strong opposition from provincial government. 
 
4.3.2 Australia’s ‘corporate cowboys’ bite the dust 
 
In Australia, as in Canada, the institutional lines between financial firms began 
to blur during the 1950s. While major banks were tightly regulated by the 
Reserve Bank of Australia, by the 1960, every big bank had acquired an equity 
stake in a major finance company, operating in the profitable fringe banking 
sector, beyond the jurisdiction of central bank controls. The finance companies 
began in hire-purchase; but became increasingly entrepreneurial and by the 
1960s and 1970s were heavily engaged in property speculation with the 
‘corporate cowboys’ of the day (Sykes 1994). Although the banks extended 
very little finance to the speculators, their finance companies were less 
cautious. This fuelled a property bubble that burst in 1974, causing a 
devastating string of corporate and financial failures. 
 
In 1979, amid growing concern about the effectiveness of existing regulations, 
the government commissioned a review of the financial system, the Campbell 
Inquiry. Although the 1981 Campbell Report noted that Australian banks had 
become significantly involved in non-banking business activities through their 
ownership of equity stakes in finance companies, money market companies, 
superannuation funds and insurance brokers (Bain & Harper 2000), its 
recommendations resulted in the introduction of an institutional system of 
regulation, composed of four main regulators: the Reserve Bank of Australia 
(RBA) was responsible for banks; the Insurance and Superannuation 
Commission (ISC) for insurers and superannuation funds; the Australian 
Securities Commission (ASC) for securities market conduct and disclosure; 
and the state and territory based State Supervisory Authorities for the building 
societies, friendly societies and credit unions. It also paved the way for 
liberalization of the financial system. 
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In 1983, Australia’s New Labour government was welcomed into office by a 
major currency crisis, brought about by speculators fearful of the change in 
government. The government’s leaders ‘immediately realized that long-term 
stability depended on reassuring a wary business community’ (Helleiner 1994, 
165) and in 1984, the Australian Financial System Review recommended 
further deregulation. However, the result was instability and scandals in both 
the corporate and financial sectors of the economy; and in 1990, Australia 
entered a severe recession, dominated by financial failure (MacFarlane 2006). 
According to Sykes (1994),  
 
‘The corporate booms and busts of the 1980s were the greatest ever seen 
in Australian history. The boom saw a bunch of corporate cowboys 
financed to dizzying heights by greedy and reckless bankers. Large 
sectors of Australian industry changed hands.’ (p. 1) 
 
In 1991, the Martin Inquiry into the effects of deregulation and the extent of 
bank competition was followed by the 1996 Wallis Inquiry, whose objective 
was to reduce the potential for regulatory arbitrage and increase neutrality 
within the Australian financial system. In particular, it explored the idea of a 
‘twin peaks’ regulatory model, favoured by the Treasury Department and 
ultimately recommended it to the Howard government (Bakir 2003). The result 
was the 1998 creation of a new single prudential regulator, the Australian 
Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA) and the Australian Securities and 
Investment Commission (ASIC). APRA took over prudential regulatory 
powers from the RBA, ISC and AFIC; and ASIC took over responsibility for 
consumer protection and market integrity from the ASC, ISC and Australian 
Consumer and Competition Committee (ACCC). To coordinate financial 
regulation among the different branches of government, the Council of 
Financial Regulators was set up, composed of representatives from the RBA, 
APRA, ASIC and the Treasury. In March 2001, the failure of Australia’s 
second largest insurance company, HIH Insurance, prompted further prudential 
regulation, bringing most insurance companies, previously only lightly 
regulated, under the jurisdiction of APRA.  
 
4.3.3 Summing things up 
 
In both Canada and Australia, the financial sector is predominantly composed 
of a relatively small number of domestic and largely immobile banks and 
financial institutions, subject to ‘twin peaks’ regulation, in which separate 
regulators have responsibility for soundness and for conduct of business 
oversight. In both Australia and Canada, financial market liberalization was 
matched by flexible regulation designed to ensure that markets were stable and 
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operated effectively. The continuous development of prudential regulation in 
response to the challenges of liberalization and shifting market conditions 
reflects the strong tradition of respect for government and for the public 
interest, which is well summarized in the credo of both countries’ 
Constitutions: ‘peace, order and good government.’17  
 
The relative strength of Canadian and Australian regulation – and its regulators 
– may also reflect popular opinion about banks and financial interests. 
According to Harris (2004, 167) ‘Bank bashing … is a favourite pastime in 
Canada, participated in by both politicians and bureaucrats’; and in Australia, 
Malcolm Maiden famously commented that ‘banks are bastards; bigger banks 
are bigger bastards’ (Maiden 2008).18 Perhaps this helps to keep the banks – 
and the bankers – in their proper place within the political and economic 
system. 
 
5. Reactions to Regulation in the Anglo-Saxon World: Conform or 
Configure? 
 
Getting around regulation, getting it changed, or simply fending it off, became 
something of an art form for the international investment banks in London and 
New York, as indeed it had for the British ‘fringe’ banks prior to the 
Secondary Banking Crisis of the 1970s and the American S&Ls during the 
1980s – each time with similar results.  
 
Canadian and Australian banks however, did not join the international party. 
They were less dependent on the money markets than their American and 
British counterparts. Canadian banks are funded mainly through deposits, 
reducing exposure to capital markets (Booth 2008, 43), and changes in interest 
rates or availability of funds. As evident in Table 3, in December 2008, 
domestic and foreign deposits accounted for 77 percent of total funding in the 
Canadian Banking Sector.  This contrasts sharply with America, where 
deposits account for only 56 percent of total funding.19 Low savings rates 
resulting from increased consumer leverage, necessitated funding through the 
financial markets.  
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Table 3:  Share of Domestic and Foreign Deposits in Total Funding* 
December 2008 
 
 Percent 
Canada 77 
Australia 61 
United Kingdom 60 
United States 56 
* Deposits include CDs. Total funding includes total liabilities, excluding 
derivative liabilities. 
 
Source: Battellino (2009) based on data from the Royal Bank of Australia and 
banks’ financial statements. 
 
In Australia and the UK, the use of foreign and domestic deposits as a source 
of funding is somewhere between the two, accounting for 60 and 61 percent, 
respectively. This was one reason for dis-intermediation and the creation of 
special investment vehicles (SIVs), especially by US banks (Booth 2008: 43). 
SIVs are ‘virtual banks’ - Essentially shell companies, with a line of credit 
from the parent bank which it was assumed would never be required; the SIV 
would fund itself via the short term money markets at low interest rates.  SIVs 
would borrow money (by issuing short-term securities at low rates of interest) 
and lend it (by buying long-term securities at a higher rate of interest), making 
a profit for investors from the difference. By buying new assets as the old ones 
matured, SIVs were envisaged to have an indefinite lifespan, offering a means 
by which regulatory capital requirements could be reduced, and the money 
invested for profit instead. 
 
In response to the increasing ease with which financial institutions could 
practice regulatory arbitrage, the US, UK, Canada and Australia were all 
signatories to the Basel II Accord. Basel II represented an attempt to extend 
consistent, international regulatory criteria to banks, especially those that had 
outgrown national jurisdictions. Among its recommendations was specification 
of the amount of capital to be held against assets on banks’ balance sheets 
which included a risk weighting criteria on differing asset classes.  
 
Although the US and UK were signatories to Basel II, the large 
internationalised banks in New York and London looked for ways around it. 
The carnage of the S&L crisis had not lived long in America’s corporate 
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memory; excessive leverage, poor lending decisions, flawed risk models and 
off-balance sheet accounting gymnastics would all be back. L.Wiliam Seidman, 
Chairman of the FDIC at the time of the S&L Crisis, in an address to Nikkin in 
Tokyo, had noted the potentially devastating effect of derivatives and off-
balance sheet transactions a decade earlier, in September 1996. 
 
‘Technology can create soundness or hinder it. Many have identified the 
globalization created by new technology as a threat to the world financial 
system. Its speed does create the potential for panic. Another danger is 
that technology also gives institutions the ability to create infinitely 
complex financial instruments. These new contracts are a two edged 
sword, giving the banks and regulators the ability to hedge risk and also 
misjudge it. The Challenge is to use technology to develop systems that 
will aid safety and soundness knowing all the while that it also has the 
potential to destroy.’ (Seidman 1997) 
 
The Basel II Accord was also circumvented in other ways. Firstly, it applied to 
banks only; and as SIVs that were trading securitized products were not 
technically banks, their relationship to regulation was unclear. Secondly, 
because risk models could apparently demonstrate a very high level of safety 
for super-senior debt, only 20 percent of the full regulatory capital against 
these assets was required. In America, regulation of the derivatives market had 
also been avoided through successful lobbying on the part of the banks (Tett, 
2009). Instead of operating in the open via an exchange, transactions were 
private, ‘over the counter’ deals; and there was a clear conflict of interest 
resulting from the issuer (rather than the investor) paying the fees associated 
with the rating of derivative products. 
 
In quite the opposite approach, Australian and Canadian banks chose to match, 
or preferably exceed, the capital reserve requirement recommendations of 
Basel II. Both countries voluntarily opted for a higher ratio of capital against 
assets, which although not adding to returns or growth, contributed positively 
to financial stability.  
 
6. The Anglo-Saxon Varieties of Liberalism are Put to the Test 
 
The conditions that produced the long consumer boom preceding the 2008 
financial crisis confronted the internationalised banks in New York and 
London with problems. Low interest rates and the large volume of Asian 
savings in the market had not only depressed returns; it also increased pressure 
from investors for higher yields, which could be generated in essentially two 
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ways: higher risk and higher leverage. Many opted for both, using the booming 
property markets as fuel.   
 
The desired returns were initially provided by Collateralised Debt Obligations 
(CDOs), derivative vehicles cherry-picking higher risk (and hence, higher 
yield) loans from conventional asset backed securities (ABS). Advances in 
computing meant that ever-more complex CDOs could be constructed by 
individuals on desktop machines and traded privately - without an exchange as 
an intermediary. When demand from investors for these ‘over the counter’ 
products (SIVs were a popular mechanism for investing in them) proved 
insatiable, erosion of initial profit margins through the increased cost of the 
underlying loans produced further creativity. The resulting ‘synthetic’ CDOs 
were constructed from the riskier parts of traditional CDOs, adding another 
layer of complexity and risk to achieve the desired returns. 
  
A governance challenge also arose in organizations with widely dispersed 
shareholder ownership, hungry for returns. The perceived risk of hostile action 
by shareholders or the markets impeded the board’s ability to take decisions 
relating to risk independently of the sector - a major contributor to a build up 
of systemic risk. JP Morgan, one of the more cautious players on Wall Street, 
paid the price for its individual view on derivative risk through a hostile 
takeover by Chase Manhattan in December 2000; (Tett 2009, 92-3) and was 
subsequently forced to again defend its continued conservative stance on 
derivatives to shareholders.  
 
A fundamental building block of CDOs were mortgage backed securities 
(MBS), mostly created in the US. However, despite recent bete noir status, 
mortgage securitisation is far from new.20 In the US, the structured financing 
of mortgage pools has its origins in the 1970s, when MBS were used to help 
the American banking sector keep up with growing demand for housing credit. 
Prior to this, banks held loans to maturity. The first MBS was created by the 
US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) in 1970; and the 
Government National Mortgage Association (Ginnie Mae) was set up to sell 
these securities with a guarantee of timely repayment on principal and interest.  
 
In the UK, where mortgage securitization in Europe was pioneered, the first 
MBS was issued in 1985 and the market grew rapidly during the housing boom 
(ODPM 2003). However, it declined equally rapidly with the recession of the 
late 1980s and remains relatively small.  More recently, despite some growth 
in the sub-prime market, consumer leverage was fuelled by other forms of 
questionable lending, notably the extraction of equity from homes to fund 
additional investment in property or consumer goods and the issuance of 
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mortgages with improbable loan to value ratios of up to 125 percent. During 
the boom, the conventional wisdom again assumed that these conditions would 
continue, eroding debt levels – until the bubble burst.  
 
Mortgage securitization is even less significant in the Canadian and Australian 
financial markets, where concern about maintaining high quality assets means 
that banks tend to operate an ‘originate to hold’ strategy – holding loans to 
maturity, rather than selling them on.  Between 2003 and 2006, MBS as a 
proportion of outstanding residential loans averaged 20.1 percent in the US, 
significantly higher than in the other three countries, accounting for 7.9 percent 
of residential loans in Australia, 6.4 percent in the UK and 3.6 percent in 
Canada (IMF 2008, 107). 
 
6.1. Fuelling the bubble: residential financing in the Anglo-Saxon world 
 
The securitization of risky American sub-prime mortgages was key to the high 
returns of the CDOs they populated; it also precipitated the crisis. Whilst sub-
prime mortgages provided the raw material for risky derivative products 
created in the US, the system of home financing in the UK, Australia and 
Canada prevented the proliferation of such risky loans in these countries. Thus, 
while home ownership patterns are comparable, the systems of home financing 
gave rise to very different outcomes with respect to mortgage lending, playing 
a role in their experience of the crisis. Nevertheless, the high returns on these 
derivative products encouraged many to invest in them, exposing investors 
around the world to the American sub-prime bubble. It is thus useful to 
examine the systems of home financing in the main Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 
The Great Depression created both mass unemployment and industrial unrest 
amongst those still working. 21  One response was to create incentives 
encouraging more American households to own their homes and in 1938, the 
Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae) was set up to purchase 
mortgages from their originators, freeing up their capital to make additional 
loans. American home ownership is also encouraged by tax policy: interest 
payments on mortgage loans are tax deductible and up to $500,000 in capital 
gains from the sale of a house is tax exempt.  At the same time, ease of 
obtaining a mortgage and limited liability in the case of default provide 
incentives to purchase houses using debt. When mortgage affordability is 
assessed, other debts are typically not taken into account; car loans, for 
example, are specifically excluded. Mortgage loans are ‘non-recourse,’ 
meaning that a home-owner’s liability is limited to the amount invested in the 
mortgage. If the mortgage debt exceeds the value of the house, it is possible to 
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turn in the keys and walk away from the loan. Mortgage insurance is optional; 
and high loan to value ratios normal, especially during a boom.  
 
The effect was spectacular; between 1940 and 1960, home ownership in the 
US rose from 43.6 to 61.9 percent (US Census Bureau 2004). By 2000, 66.2 
percent of American households owned their homes.  This figure peaked in 
2004 at 69.0 percent before declining slightly to 67.4 percent in 2009 (US 
Census Bureau 2010). However, whilst the ‘easy in’ policies encouraged rapid 
growth in home ownership, their counterpart, ‘easy out’ options also built in a 
much higher degree of volatility than in the other three systems. 
 
In the UK, many homes were rented, but from 1980, under the Thatcher 
government’s ‘right to buy’ legislation, there was a rapid expansion in home 
ownership. As with America during the inter-war period, a political agenda lay 
behind this; increasing the rate of home ownership by offering more and 
cheaper mortgages and privatizing government-owned housing was part of a 
wider strategy, which included encouraging people to buy shares in newly 
privatized businesses and expand conservative party support.  
 
Under the 1980 Housing Act, UK public sector tenants were encouraged to 
purchase the properties they occupied, at heavily discounted prices. In 1981, 
56 percent of British households lived in owner-occupied accommodations; by 
2003, the figure had risen to 68 percent and by 2007, it was 70 percent (ONS 
2010).  In contrast to the American system, however, the Conservative 
government soon began to cut back on income support for mortgage interest 
and withdraw mortgage interest tax relief, which by 2000, under New Labour, 
was completely abolished. Thus, from the mid 1990s, there was a steady 
reduction in government support for home ownership, as measured by income 
support for mortgage interest, mortgage income tax relief, stamp duty and 
inheritance tax (Williams & Pannell 2007). As increasing house prices 
outpaced earnings growth and affordability, and with growing interest in 
strengthening public services, attention has been re-focused on housing policy 
in favour of home ownership (Williams & Parnell 2007, 5). The 2001 Starter 
Home Initiative and the 2004 Key Worker Living Scheme were introduced to 
help key public sector workers, particularly nurses, teachers and police, to buy 
or rent homes in the communities in which they serve. Mortgage support 
schemes have also been set up to provide assistance to first-time home buyers 
and to those experiencing difficulty paying their mortgage due to 
unemployment or a short-term decline in income.  
 
British – and especially American – home ownership and financing systems 
stand in sharp contrast with those of Australia and Canada. In these countries, 
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mortgage insurance is mandatory and lending criteria more stringent. The 
regulator’s emphasis on the quality of assets means that instead of securitizing 
mortgages, banks hold onto them until they are paid-off. Adjustable rate and 
interest-only mortgages are virtually unheard of.  There are no non-recourse 
loans and mortgage interest is not tax deductible. The sub-prime market is thus 
relatively insignificant in both countries.   
 
Whilst, ironically – given the retreat of the state in most other areas - the 
American system is a product of heavy and on-going government intervention, 
the Australian mortgage system is a product of minimal intervention, the last 
of which was phased-out during the early 1990s with the collapse of the New 
South Wales government-owned equivalent to Fannie Mae (Stapledon 2009).  
In Australia, mortgages have traditionally been limited to a level where debt 
servicing accounts for less than 30 percent of a borrower’s gross income. More 
recently, this was adjusted such that income above the ‘costs of living’ serves 
as the basis for assessing mortgage affordability (Laker 2004, 6). As the costs 
of living can be considered independent of income level, wealthier individuals 
can expand debt further than others. As a result, only those who can afford to 
take on the debt can secure mortgage loans. Mortgage debt is insured by 
Lenders’ Mortgage Insurance (LMI), which covers 100 percent of mortgage 
debt, transferring the risk of credit exposure to the insurer. Although there was 
some securitization of mortgages during the 1990s and 2000s, a strong 
ownership culture combined with non-deductibility of interest and no capital 
gains tax on owner-occupied property provide strong incentives for Australians 
to build equity in their homes. At the same time, high property market 
transparency and the predominance of Listed Property Trusts (LPTs) as issuers 
of mortgage backed securities contributes to the relative stability of the MBS 
market in Australia (Australian Securitization Forum 2008). LPTs are legally 
required to report their activities and underlying collateral performance to the 
regulators (ASX and ASIC). 
 
In Canada, too, the mortgage market is highly restrictive.  The vast majority of 
mortgages are originated by banks to hold, thereby providing a strong 
incentive to not lend where there is a high risk of default. All mortgages with 
less than a 20 percent down payment must be insured by the Canadian 
Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CHMC), backed by government 
guarantee. As a result, Canadian mortgages are much less leveraged, 
translating to lower risk for the lender.  Established in 1945, the CMHC 
insures the principal and interest on Canadian mortgage loans, backed by its 
borrowing power under federal government legislation, the National Housing 
Act (NHA). High credit standards on eligibility for mortgage insurance, 
imposed by government regulators, were recently tightened to guard against a 
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US style housing bubble (CBC News 2010). As a result, only those who can 
demonstrate an ability to repay the loan are able to secure mortgages in Canada. 
In 1985, the CMHC introduced the National Housing Act Mortgage Backed 
Securities (NHA MBS) programme in response to rising mortgage costs. In 
1987, following investors’ complaints about the lengthy payment period on 
defaulted loans during the 1980s, the NHA MBS programme added a 
‘guarantee of timely payment.’ This effectively removed risk from the 
equation. With a defaulted mortgage, the payments would be kept up until the 
principal amount was repaid by the guarantor, the CMHC. The stability of the 
Canadian MBS market was further strengthened and liquidity increased in 
2001, when the CMHS introduced the 3 and 5 year Canada Mortgage Bond 
(CMB), guaranteed by the CMHC. 
 
Thus, although MBS are present in the British, Australian and Canadian 
financial systems, they do not account for a significant proportion of the 
market.  Further, given the nature of house financing in these countries – 
especially Australia and Canada – there has been little or no growth in the 
volatile sub-prime sector, which remains very small outside of the US.  
 
6.2. Neoclassical liberalization finally goes too far 
 
By the mid 2000s, the housing boom in America was cooling, so the search for 
yield by the internationalised banks intensified. An apparent solution was 
found in ever more extreme parts of the American sub-prime sector. Here, 
heightened risk meant higher returns in the securitised products built from 
these mortgages. However, exploiting these highly risky segments would 
require nearly complete relaxation of lending criteria, which in turn created 
pressure to securitize sub-prime loans more quickly, before they went bad. 
Closer examination of the criteria for sub-prime lending reveals the reason 
why: all that was required was a willingness to sign up for an Adjustable Rate 
Mortgage (ARM). No proof of income, no documentation and no insurance 
was required. However, a very low initial rate – and many could barely afford 
even that – quickly increased to unaffordable levels. Even when the initial rate 
was being paid, under Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP), 
lenders could show the full amount in their books, so by the time the mortgage 
defaulted, it would be someone else’s problem. So popular were these products 
that between 2000 and 2005 sub-prime mortgage backed bonds exploded from 
$80 billion, or less than a tenth of the market in 2000, to $800 billion or almost 
half, by 2005 (Tett 2009).  
 
For the ARM loan holders, though, things were even worse; the sub-prime 
bubble had lengthened the property boom, so they had bought at the very top 
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of the market. Not only could they not afford their loans, there was no 
incentive to even try. With non-recourse loans, they could easily walk away; so 
they did exactly that – in their droves. But when default rates outpaced 
expectations, investor confidence collapsed, as did liquidity in the money 
markets and the ability of many SIVs to fund themselves. 
 
The relaxation of lending criteria, however, also required relaxation by other 
regulators - in particular the Federal Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (HUD). Whilst the Clinton administration had set targets to help 
more low income and minority families own their own homes, it had also 
charged HUD with curbing predatory lending. By not allowing Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac to get involved with the riskiest sub-prime loans, it was 
expected that the worst excesses of the lenders would be limited. However, in 
spite of warnings by HUD researchers in 2001 that default rates were rising, 
little action was taken. By the time HUD targets were next revised, in 2004 
under the Bush administration, the affordable housing goal was raised from 50 
to 56 percent, Freddie and Fannie’s purchases of sub-prime securities had risen 
by a factor of ten; between 2004 and 2006, they purchased an additional $434 
billion of sub-prime loans, exposing borrowers to exploitation and the 
securities market to extreme volatility. HUD has since been severely criticised 
for poor policy implementation and weak regulation. According to Senator 
Jack Reed, 
 
‘We need to focus on putting families in homes they can truly afford, 
not just getting a sale, packaging the loan into a sophisticated financial 
security and walking away to the next closing. Today people are 
wondering, “why weren’t the regulators and the industry probing these 
loans more deeply?”’ (Leonnig 2008) 
 
By contrast, in response to continuing house price inflation in Australia, the 
Australian Prudential Regulatory Authority (APRA), well aware that house 
prices could not increase forever, warned that competition for a share of a 
slowing house lending market should not lead to an easing of credit standards. 
Instead, banks were advised to consider alternative investment opportunities, 
in particular a return to corporate lending (Laker 2004, 9).  This more cautious 
approach may have prevented a further increase in investment – at lower 
lending standards – in the housing sector, ultimately contributing to gentle 
deflation of the Australian housing bubble and avoiding the destruction of a 
burst. 
 
With hindsight, the American sub-prime bubble appears to be the inevitable 
result of successful lobbying for successive and specific loosening of 
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regulation in order to allow predatory mortgage lending practices and toothless 
housing policy. The securitization of sub prime mortgages encouraged risk-
taking in lending; the predominance of non-recourse loans encouraged risk-
taking in borrowing; and housing policy designed to promote sub-prime 
lending in a system where there is little regulation or supervision of the market 
for derivative products both legislated and legitimated risk-taking on the part 
of all involved. The failure of policy-makers to address the obvious problem of 
risk that is inherent in the American house financing system however suggests 
that political influences and vested interests may be at play, hinting at undue 
private sector influence over the state. This, in many ways, is the underlying 
principle defining the Varieties of Liberalism approach – the relative balance 
of power between the state and the private sector, and the character of that 
relationship. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
The return to economic liberalism in the Anglo-Saxon world was motivated by 
the apparent failure of Keynesian economic management to control the 
stagflation of the 1970s and early 1980s. In this context, the theories of 
economic liberalism, championed by Friederich von Hayek, Milton Friedman 
and the Chicago School economists, provided an alternative. However, the 
divergent experience of the US, UK, Canada and Australia reveals two distinct 
‘varieties’ of economic liberalism: the ‘neo-classical’ incarnation, which 
describes American and British liberal capitalism, and the more ‘balanced’ 
economic liberalism that evolved in Canada and Australia. In large part, these 
were a product of the way that liberal economic theory was understood and 
translated into policy, which in turn shaped the evolving relationship between 
the state and the private sector and the relative position of the financial sector 
within the broader economic system. Together, these determined the nature 
and extent of financial market regulation and the system’s relative stability 
during the 2008 crisis. 
 
7.1 The ‘neo-classical’ and more ‘balanced’ varieties of economic liberalism 
 
In the US and the UK, ‘Reaganomics’ and ‘Thatcherism’ represented a 
conscious rejection of Keynesian theory and a re-orientation of policy, away 
from reducing unemployment and boosting growth, towards improving the 
productivity of individual sectors within the economy. In both countries, a 
strong central government, led by a charismatic leader, was able to effect a 
radical change in policy, emphasizing the merits of free markets, private sector 
provision, withdrawal of the state and individualisation of social welfare. 
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In Canada and Australia however, whilst the challenges of the 1970s 
undermined confidence in the state’s ability to manage the economy, it did not 
weaken support for the social welfare state. Canadian and Australian economic 
liberalism thus emphasized the merits of competition in markets (rather than 
focusing purely on market freedom); it sought to limit the role of the state in 
the provision of services, but without compromising access to basic health, 
education and income security. Economic liberalization was therefore 
accompanied by regulation designed to permit the market to function 
effectively; and to the degree that public services were privatized, the state 
assumed a strong role in regulation in the public interest. 
 
In both Canada and Australia, economic liberalism was interpreted and 
implemented by successive Liberal and/or Labour governments, in an 
incremental process that involved the co-operation of economic liberals and 
modernizing social democrats; and those policies that were seen to best serve 
the interests of society were evolved through a process that encouraged 
learning to take place when challenges were encountered. The existence of 
countervailing forces, including strong regional governments and effective 
mechanisms for the participation of a range of stakeholders, including citizens 
and representatives from both sides of industry, resulted in a more ‘balanced’ 
approach to economic liberalism that in some respects, served to enhance the 
capacity of the Canadian and Australian states.  
 
Despite the logical coherence of economic liberalism in Australia and Canada, 
however, the process of incorporating it into policy was evolutionary, rather 
than consciously planned. It is thus possible to argue the existence of a third – 
more deliberate – variety of liberalism: ‘ordoliberalism.’ Whilst ordoliberalism 
contains many of the features that distinguish the Australian and Canadian 
varieties of economic liberalism from their American and British counter-parts, 
the crucial difference is that far from being accidental, ordoliberalism 
represents an overall vision of economic liberalization. The theory was 
championed by Walter Eucken and Alexander Rüstow and arises from 
Germany, a nation with very strong regional governments as well as 
institutions for joint consultation and collective participation in debates about 
social and economic policy – all powerful veto players. 
 
7.2. The theoretical and historical roots of ‘ordoliberalism’ 
 
‘Ordoliberalism’ 22  was originally conceptualized by the economists of the 
German Freiburg School during the interwar period (Boas & Gans-Morse 
2009). Drawing on the concept of ‘ordo,’ the Latin word for ‘order,’ 
ordoliberalism refers to an ideal economic system that would be more orderly 
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than the laissez faire economy advocated by classical liberals (Oliver 1960, 
133-34). Following the 1929 Stock Market Crash and Great Depression, while 
Franklin Roosevelt was pledging a ‘New Deal’ for Americans and John 
Maynard Keynes was writing The General Theory, intellectuals of the German 
Freiburg School were proposing a pragmatic revision of liberal economic 
policy. They argued that for the free market to function effectively, the state 
should assume an active role, supported by a strong legal system and 
appropriate regulatory framework.  Without a strong government, they argued, 
private interests, in a system characterized by differences in relative power 
would serve to undermine competition (Oliver 1960, Boarman 1964, Gerber 
1994). The German ordoliberals were concerned that the rules of the game not 
favour the powerful and wealthy (Gerber 1994, 38). However, they opposed 
full-scale Keynesian employment policies and an extensive welfare state. 
Instead, the ordoliberals believed that liberalism – the freedom of individuals 
to compete in markets – should be separated from laissez faire – the freedom 
of markets from government intervention. 
 
Walter Eucken, one of the founding fathers and most influential 
representatives of the Freiburg School, criticised classical laissez faire 
liberalism for its ‘naturalistic naivety,’ which finds expression in the US and 
UK varieties of liberalism. These systems hold onto the belief that the market 
is a ‘natural given’, a natural order which occurs spontaneously if the state 
does not hamper its emergence (Foucault 2004). On the contrary, Eucken’s 
understanding of the market and of competition is very much at odds with the 
classical (and neo-classical) liberal notion that markets constitute some sort of 
natural order, which requires protection from excessive state interference. In 
Eucken’s view, the market and competition can only exist if a strong state 
establishes an economic order. The state’s role must be clearly delimited; but 
in the area where the state has a role to play, it needs to be powerful and active. 
It is this theory of order that distinguishes German ordoliberalism most clearly 
from its American neo-classical cousin. For ordoliberals, government is the 
solution to the problem, so long as it is the right kind of government. Only 
specific conditions – created by the state – can establish competitive markets. 
It is not about rolling back the state to free the underlying natural market order. 
Rather, it is about a strong state creating a functioning and humane economic 
order (Goldschmidt & Rauchenschwandtner 2007, Eucken 1932, Rüstow 1953 
and 1957).  
 
This humane economic order has the principle of competition at its heart; 
and it is through this principle that the state constitutes its raison d’etre. 
This perspective was expressed by Alexander Rüstow, a prominent 
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German ordo-liberal, in a 1932 essay entitled ‘Free Economy – Strong 
State.’  In the words of OM Hartwich (2009, 14):  
 
‘Rüstow blamed excessive interventionism for the economic crisis. He 
also warned of burdening the state with the task of correcting all sorts 
of economic problems. His speech was the clear rejection of a state 
that gets involved with economic processes. In its place, Rüstow 
wanted to see a state that set the rules for economic behaviour and 
enforced compliance with them. It was a limited role for the state but it 
required a strong state nonetheless. Apart from this task, however, the 
state should refrain from getting too engaged in markets. This meant a 
clear ‘no’ to protectionism, subsidies, cartels – or what today we 
would call ‘crony capitalism,’ ‘regulatory capture,’ or ‘corporate 
welfare.’ However, Rüstow also saw a role for a limited 
interventionism as long as it went ‘in the direction of the market’s 
laws.’’ 
 
Conversely, as the state had to be powerful, but limited, markets were 
similarly not seen as an absolute principle, but as one that had to be confined 
within a given economic order. According to Wilhelm Röpke, another major 
figure in ordoliberlism,  
 
‘[W]e must stress most emphatically that we have no intention to 
demand more from competition than it can give. It is a means of 
establishing order and exercising control in the narrow sphere of a 
market economy based on the division of labor, but no principle on 
which a whole society can be built. From the sociological and moral 
point of view it is even dangerous because it tends more to dissolve 
than to unite. If competition is not to have the effect of a social 
explosive and is at the same time not to degenerate, its premise will be 
a correspondingly sound political and moral framework. There should 
be a strong state, aloof from the hungry hordes of vested interests, a 
high standard of business ethics, and undegenerated community of 
people ready to co-operate with each other, who have a natural 
attachment to, and a firm place in society’ (Röpke 1950, 181). 
 
In other words, for ordoliberals, it was not the state but private 
monopolies that were the main enemy of a free society. In order to 
preserve a free society, the state had to be strong and impose a rigorous 
competition policy. Another central claim of the ordoliberal school was 
the importance of creating an economy where production is decentralised 
and takes place in relatively small units (Röpke 1950, Röpke 1981, 
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Rüstow 1953 and 1957). Achieving this implied a role for the state in 
preventing powerful actors from concentrating their economic power. 
Hayek, who was early-on in his career a connector between the German 
ordo-liberals and the US neo-liberals (Foucault 2004), defended similar 
views regarding decentralisation (Gamble 1996). But, in the more 
libertarian views of Milton Friedman, the free play of markets 
overwhelmed concerns about concentration of economic power in certain 
industries. 
 
To what extent it would be possible to have deliberately imposed such a wide 
ranging system on another economy is a moot point; and much would depend 
upon the scale of Galbraith’s ‘massive onslaught of circumstance’ and the 
nature of Friedman’s ‘ideas lying around at the time.’ In the final analysis, it is 
time to engage in a debate about the true nature of the varieties that exist 
within economic liberalism. Only then will we be able to understand the type 
that has failed and in so doing to identify ways out of the current crisis of 
contemporary capitalism. 
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Notes 
 
1 According to Hall and Soskice (2001), LMEs rely on market mechanisms to solve the 
problem of coordination, both among firms and between firms and their various stakeholder 
groups, including employees, customers, suppliers and capital providers. LMEs have open 
and competitive markets that are protected by strict anti-trust and competition legislation. 
Levels of regulation, taxation and government intervention in the macro-economy are 
comparatively low. Labour markets are flexible; and in comparison with the coordinated 
market economies (CMEs), employment protection and welfare spending are relatively low. 
2 Table 1 reports the change in cumulated market value of each country’s largest banks, i.e. 
those among the world’s fifty largest banks. 
3 It should be noted however that the Harper government in Canada decided in the autumn 
of 2008 to make available a bailout/stimulus package of C$ 75bn, corresponding with 4.3 
per cent of GDP. Yet this package can by no means be compared to the US or UK rescue 
packages. The Canadian ‘bailout plan’ consisted of the government’s commitment to buy 
‘good’ – as opposed to ‘toxic’ – assets from the banks so as to inject liquidity into the 
banking system and, ultimately, the real economy. These funds were thus made available to 
prevent a slowdown in economic growth rather than to support failing banks. Nevertheless, 
a proportion of these funds was used to acquire parts of foreign banks that were in trouble 
and to make strategic acquisitions in attractive markets such as Brazil (Chossudovsky 2009, 
Heinrich 2009). 
4 Canada appeared somewhat less vulnerable (in terms of its current account balance and 
mortgage debt to GDP ratio). See Konzelmann, Fovargue-Davies and Schnyder (2010), 
especially section 2, for a further discussion. 
5 In 2008, the mortgage debt to GDP ratio was 71 per cent in the US, 86.3 per cent in the 
UK and 85 per cent in Australia (Vorms 2009, Keen 2009). This is in contrast to the much 
lower ratio of 45.6 per cent in Canada (Keen 2009). 
6 Höpner et al. (2009, 5-6) single out three defining principles of a liberal economic order: 
individual responsibility, decentralized decision-making and competition. 
7 Research on the role of ideas in economic change in the field of political science largely 
supports this view: External shocks and economic crises challenge and destabilise the 
existing orthodoxy which did not manage to prevent or was even the very cause of the crisis. 
As the dominant view is weakened, ‘policy entrepreneurs’ use existing ideas or reactivate 
old ones in order to propose alternatives to the failed existing orthodoxy (Blyth 2002, Hall 
1993). 
8 For a further discussion, see Konzelmann, Wilkinson, Fovargue-Davies and Sankey 2010. 
9 By contrast, New Keynesians attributed stagflation to the presence of union monopoly that 
served to increase wages above their market clearing rate, thereby causing unemployment to 
rise. From this perspective, attempts to increase employment beyond the ‘non-accelerating 
inflation rate of unemployment’ (NAIRU), would merely fuel inflation (Meade 1982). Thus, 
for both Liberal and New Keynesian economists, there was a simple choice between higher 
real wages and more jobs.  
 
10 Rational expectations theory posits that outcomes do not differ systematically from what 
people rationally expect. 
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11 Under the Bretton Woods system, most countries sought to maintain an overall balance of 
trade, settling international trade balances in US dollars, with the US’s agreement to redeem 
other central banks’ dollar holdings for gold at a fixed rate of thirty-five dollars per ounce. 
The US, however, had not been not overly concerned about maintaining a balance in trade 
since it could pay its export deficits in dollars. Nor had it taken action to prevent the steady 
loss of American gold. By 1971, under pressure to devalue its currency, due to the decline in 
US gold reserves, instead of devaluing the dollar, President Nixon removed gold backing 
from the dollar. 
12 Pressures contributing to unemployment during this period were in part a result of the (not 
yet evident) hollowing-out of the British manufacturing sector through leveraged buyouts 
which continued into the 1970s. See also Konzelmann, Wilkinson, Fovargue-Davies and 
Sankey 2010. 
13 The American, British and Canadian voting systems are plurality systems in which seats 
are awarded to the person with the most votes, even if it is not a majority. This is in contrast 
with the Australian system, which seeks to resolve the concern about balancing plurality 
with proportional representation. In Australia, seats are awarded in the upper house on the 
basis of proportional representation by states and territories and in the lower house on the 
basis of preferential voting. This system is argued to produce a more stable government 
while having better diversity of parties to review its actions (Calvo 2009, Morelli 2004). 
14 The efficient markets theory of financial securities prices, which is rooted in rational 
expectations theory, asserts that the price of an asset reflects all relevant available 
information about its value.  
15 Five different US federal agencies share responsibility for regulating depository 
institutions: the Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), National 
Credit Union Administration (NCUA), Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
and Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS). Depending on its legal structure, a depository 
institution may be subject to regulation by up to three of these federal agencies as well as a 
state regulator. State authorities are also responsible for regulating the insurance industry. 
The national securities markets being regulated by the Securities Exchange Commission 
(SEC) and the futures markets are regulated by the Commodities Futures Trading 
Commission (CFTC), individual derivatives and commodities exchanges and the National 
Futures Association (a self-regulating organization (SRO)).  
16 The RTC was established and assigned responsibility for winding-up the failed S&Ls. 
17 It is interesting to note the contrast with the American credo: ‘life liberty and the pursuit 
of happiness.’ 
18Malcolm Maiden is business editor for The Age. 
19 One explanation for this pattern is the existence of caps on deposit rates in the US. Since 
banks could only promise a limited return on bank accounts, savings were channelled away 
from them, leading to lower levels of deposits, further increasing incentives for banks to 
rely on money markets (Booth 2008, 43). 
20 Prior to the first CDO created for Imperial Savings & Loans, MBSs had a successful track 
record. Corporate debt also has a history of securitisation, but is much easier for investors to 
assess than mortgage debt. Aside from broad indications of the source of the mortgages in 
the securitized product, the system’s stability is reliant on solid lending criteria for a low 
rate of default. America however, evolved the least stringent lending criteria of the four 
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countries in our study – and carried out the vast majority of securitisations of the resulting 
loans. 
21 In the US, a strike at Ford’s Detroit plant in 1938 resulted in the strikers being summarily 
fired. This triggered the events leading up to the ‘Ford Massacre’ and the deaths of four 
workers. The ensuing public outrage resonated with then current events in China and 
Germany and with the revolution in Russia fifteen years earlier. As a result, one of the aims 
of the Roosevelt Administration’s New Deal was to foster co-operation among workers, 
industry and government and in so doing to avoid the likelihood of more radical social 
change (Ferguson 2002). 
22 For further discussion of the historical development of ‘ordo-liberalism,’ see Hartwich 
(2009) and Boas and Gans-Morse (2009), who trace the origin of the term – originally used 
synonymously with ‘neo-liberalism’ – to inter-war Germany and the intellectual writing of 
the Freiburg School. In this context, ‘neo-liberalism’ means quite the opposite of its 
contemporary usage.  Hence, in the discussion here, we use the term ‘ordo-liberalism’ to 
avoid confusion with the more classical economic liberalism associated with contemporary 
‘neo-liberalism.’
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